Tajikistan: Lessons on Migration

Regionally dependent

• On paper, Tajikistan doesn’t stand out: surrounded by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, China, and Afghanistan, it relies heavily on economic support from larger powers. Traditionally, this was Russia. Approximately 1 million Tajiks reside in the Federation (New York Times, 2025) and send a sizeable number of remittances back home to support the local economy.

• However, with Russia’s recent diplomatic and economic woes, the pattern is starting to change. This begs a question: is this a structural shift on which investors can capitalise on, or is it simply a rerouting of the expats, changing only the destination, but not the end result?

Take a step back

• With a GDP per capita of only $1430 (IMF, 2025), Tajikistan is among the poorest countries in the Central Asian region. Nevertheless, it is one of the fastest growing ones: GDP growth has been consistently above 8% in 2024, driven primarily by an expanding services and industry (World Bank, 2025).

• The Rogun hydroelectric power plant, financed with $550 million from the Islamic Development Bank, has been a key driver and a flagship project for the state. It will feature the world’s tallest dam and will relieve some of the seasonal power shortages that the country faces (Reuters, 2024).

• However, the economy still faces a major peculiarity: in 2024, 49% of GDP was generated from remittances (World Bank, 2025). There are few countries like it.

What this means

• With remittances being such a crucial component of the economy, it is important to understand where they are coming from.

• Since Russia’s diplomatic and economic isolation from the West began in 2022, Tajiks, whose primarily destination it used to be, are increasingly deciding to emigrate to different parts of the world.

• As of September 2024, a total of over 500,000 labour migrants had returned to Tajikistan. This represents a 13% increase compared to the same period in 2023 (Reliefweb, 2025). This reflects the increased pressure to avoid the dominant Russian market, and tough visa regimes elsewhere.

• Therefore, we could be witnessing a crucial structural shift for the Tajik economy: with the oncoming pressure on the domestic labour market, private markets have to step up for job creation, and the government is primed for increased spending on infrastructure projects, which would plug the gap.

Key Risks

• Migration to Russia still remains strong: for 25 years over 75% of seasonal migrants went to Russia (OSW, 2024). This represents a high-risk premium, as relation could represent volatility and backlash from the America and Europe.

• Reliance on remittances implies a structural risk, inevitably tied to the destination of the migrants. This creates exposure to volatility and external shocks.

• Regional instability, especially due to the proximity to Afghanistan, presents a unique political risk premium.

The Cordoba View

• Barbell positioning: near-term upside in private markets balanced with long-duration credit and infrastructure bets such as Rogun.

• High risk premiums: Russia dependency, ruble volatility, and governance gaps mean all exposures must be priced with elevated risk spreads.

• Remittance resilience vs fragility: inflows sustain consumption and liquidity, but do not translate into productivity; return migration highlights the structural need for reform.